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The DCI, the Executive, and the Congress

1. This paper is an attempt to delineate the DCI's various roles in relation to the executive and legislative branches. It examines whether his duties to one branch are compatible, or can be made compatible, with his duties to the other. It does not examine whether his duties to the executive are fully compatible with one another, but such an examination might be useful.

2. For the Executive

- The DCI is a staff officer to the President, his adviser on all foreign intelligence matters.
- The DCI is the primary source of positive foreign intelligence for the President and his staff, for the NSC, and for all departments and agencies except State and Defense. For the latter he is one of several sources.
- The DCI can be a foreign policy adviser to the President, comparable to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

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-The DCI is an agent of the President in his conduct of foreign policy through covert action, liaison with foreign governments, communications, etc.

-The DCI acts for the President as the coordinator of all foreign intelligence activities of the federal government (through USIB, IRAC, and EXCOM).

-The DCI is a line officer heading a major independent agency, responsible to the President.

3. For the Congress

-The DCI is the primary source of positive foreign intelligence

-The DCI is the officer who must present and defend the intelligence budget for all foreign intelligence activities.

-The DCI, like the Secretary of State, is an agent of the President in the conduct of certain aspects of foreign policy. He must inform the Congress of his actions and it can be assumed that he will be expected to defend them post facto. (But this is limited to covert action programs).

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-The DCI, as the head of an independent agency, must present his budget and programs to Congress, and must be prepared to account for the activities of his organization.

4. Schematically

	Executive	Congressional
As Presidential Adviser	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Provides intelligence -Advises on intelligence -Can advise on foreign policy 	
As head of Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Provides intelligence--- -Advises on Community--- -Coordinates Community--- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides intelligence Defends community budget Advises on intelligence
As head of CIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Provides intelligence--- -Runs Agency----- -Carries out covert action programs----- -Acts as Presidential agent to foreign governments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides intelligence (Defends Agency Budget (Accounts for its activities Informs on and defends covert action programs

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5. When looked at this way, most relationships are compatible. For instance the DCI deals with the oversight and appropriations committees in essentially the same way as the head of any other agency. There are some obvious exceptions, however.

-The intelligence the DCI provides as Presidential adviser is less formal and more directly oriented toward specific policy issues than that he usually provides as Chairman of USIB or as head of CIA.

It is not appropriate for him to give this intelligence to Congress in context, although Congress may well receive much of the substance.

-The DCI gets in trouble when the intelligence he gives Congress runs crossways to policy or appears contradictory to intelligence given Congress by Defense. He could minimize this by briefing Congress on substance only when wearing his Community hat.

-The DCI that provides close intelligence support to Presidential policy-making is the DCI that needs budgeting authority to ensure that the systems responds to Presidential intelligence needs. But the former should not be available to Congress while the latter must.

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-Congress expects the DCI to defend a Community intelligence budget as well as a CIA one. But his influence on the former is much less than over the latter. This anomaly would disappear if he had the budgetary authority we believe he should have, but a DCI who had such authority along with his present ones might appear too powerful to the Congress.

-Congress will almost certainly insist in the future on a single coherent intelligence budget, which implies a single officer equipped to defend it.

-The DCI's use of CIA as an arm for Presidential action other than CA programs is not subject to Congressional review, but is located where it should be.

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